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Abstract 
The principal proposition this paper will endeavour to maintain is that the liquidity
of the budget is not fully managed by the Ministry of Finance, which is why it is unable,
in collaboration with the Croatian National Bank, to rein in and slow down the growth
in short-term public debt. Only since 2001, thanks to institutional improvements, have the
conditions been created in the Ministry of Finance for cash and liquidity management.
Thus payments operations, previously in the hands of a government institution, were
taken over by the banks; the financial operations of budgetary spending agencies were
channelled via the Single Account of the Treasury; and government deposits were grad-
ually transferred from numerous commercial banks to the Single Account of the Treasury
in the Croatian National Bank and the state-owned Croatian Postal Bank. Unfortunately,
however, the Ministry of Finance, in collaboration with the Croatian National Bank, still
carries out no operation of cash and liquidity management within the government
Treasury system, nor does it operate on the money market with its surplus budgetary
resources. Because of this state of affairs, management of the cash and liquidity of the
central government budget is within the purview of the commercial banks.
Keywords: Single Account of the Treasury, payments operations, management of
cash and liquidity, commercial banks
1 Introduction
The chief objective of this paper is to determine if the Croatian Finance Ministry, in col-
laboration with the Croatian National Bank (CNB) can really manage the cash and liquidity
* The author would like to thank the peer reviewers and Dubravko Mihaljek for the constructive proposals,
advice and suggestions which led to this paper being more effectively shaped.
** Received: May 2, 2005
Accepted: June 22, 2005of the government budget, carry out financial operations within the system of the Treasury,
that is, become a banker of its spending agencies and actively take part in the money market,
supplying liquidity. The main proposition is that the Finance Ministry does not manage the
cash and liquidity of the government budget, for which reason it cannot, even in cooperation
with the CNB, rein in or slow down the rise in the short-term public debt.
In most countries the management of cash is a function of the state treasury through
which the Finance Ministry ensures control of cash flows via the system of the Single
Account of the Treasury (in domestic and foreign currency) and the centralization of the
deposits of the state budget and the extra-budgetary funds in a single account in the cen-
tral bank. Managing liquidity, the Finance Ministry carries out in-house operations in
the treasury system relating to ensuring the most favourable conditions for short-term
borrowing, laying out surplus budgetary resources on the money market, granting loans
to spending agencies and maintaining deposits in commercial banks at the most
favourable rates of interest.
Management of cash is the function of the treasury according to which the Finance
Ministry carries out control of the flow of money to and from the government’s account,
and control of resources collected and disbursements made. This control does not cover
only budgetary revenue and expenditure but also the payments in and out made via the
extra-budgetary funds. The cash management system for the whole of the state must pro-
vide certain information, e.g., about the dynamics with which revenue arrives, the maturi-
ty of liabilities, the timetable for debt servicing or receipts expected from the sale of assets. 
The main objectives of cash and liquidity management are control of government
spending, effective implementation of the budget and the minimisation of the costs of bor-
rowing. For this reason for successful implementation of the budget the Finance Ministry
must make sure that liabilities are met in line with the terms of contracts and the collec-
tion of revenue in time. The Finance Ministry must minimise transactional costs, borrow
money at the lowest rates of interests and create additional cash by investing in yield-bear-
ing securities. It should avoid making payments in advance and also ensure precise records
of the dates when liabilities become payable (Allen and Tommasi, 2001:243).
For the management of cash and liquidity it is crucial to ensure operations of state or
government institutions through the Single Account of the Treasury, good payments oper-
ations to be carried out by the banks, and the orderly meeting of government liabilities. 
This paper is divided into four parts. In the next chapter the role of the Croatian Finance
Ministry in the establishment of cash and liquidity management is explained. In Part 3 the
main constraints affecting the ability of the Finance Ministry (FM) to take part in the money
market are outlined, within the context of a financial analysis. A detailed analysis is made
of the size of transactions via the government budget for the 1994 to 2005 period, as well
as of outstanding liabilities, the balances and structure of government deposits, the terms on
which the government borrowed on the money market and (directly) via the commercial
banks, the size and structure of short-term government borrowing, and the state of liquidi-
ty in the accounts of the government. Special emphasiseis made of the reasons why the FM,
in collaboration with the CNB, was unable to rein in or slow down the growth in short-term
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reform of domestic currency pay-
ments operations 2001
payments operations take place 
in banks
ban on government borrowing 
at the CNB
2001 stopping monetization 
of budget deficit
improvement of foreign currency
payments operations 
in government accounts
2003 carrying out foreign currency 
payments operations in the CNB
control of liabilities 
of government budget
2001 ensuring financial discipline 
and orderly execution of the budget
single Account of the Treasury 
– kuna
2001
centralisation of cash flows and
deposits of the budget in the SAT 
in the CNB
single Account of the Treasury 
– foreign currency
2003
centralisation of foreign currency
deposits of the government 
at the SFCAT.
public debt. In Part 4, conclusions are worked out and recommendations made for institu-
tional changes in the system of managing the cash and liquidity of the Croatian budget.
2 The practice of cash and liquidity management in the Croatian Finance
Ministry during the 1994-2005
From 1994 to 2001 there was no cash and liquidity management function in the FM
(see annexe). The Cash Flow Management Department in the Public Debt Management
Sector did not supervise all the money flows relating to the payment of revenue into and the
payments made from the state or national budget. Apart from that, a considerable part of
the financial transactions were carried out via the extra-budgetary funds, which the FM nei-
ther supervised nor controlled. The FM on the whole financed short-term budgetary deficits
via direct borrowing from the CNB and other government institutions, notwithstanding the
existence of liquid budgetary resources in deposit accounts in the CNB and in commercial
banks. From 2000 the problem of cash and liquidity management has become exacerbated
because the FM is no longer allowed to borrow money directly from the CNB.
From 2001 to 2005 the Government, in collaboration with the FM and the CNB
took several key steps that ensured the institutional premises for cash and liquidity man-
agement (Table 1) and made it possible for the FM to lay out surplus budgetary cash on
the money market overnight.
Table 1 Institutional changes in Croatia as preconditions for cash and liquidity 
management since 2001
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Thanks to these changes, from 2001 on the FM was for the first time in control of
the financial operations of institutions that it financed out of the central government bud-
get, for in-payments and out-payments were carried out by the Single Account of the
Treasury held at the CNB (both domestic and foreign currency accounts). From 2001,payments operations were taken over by the commercial banks, and from 2003 the CNB
additionally took over from the commercial banks foreign currency payments operations
for the accounts of the government.
In the proposals of the Government for a change in the payments operations system,
which was to move from the Payments Clearing Institute (ZAP) to the banks, it was nec-
essary to define the relationship between the CNB and the FM. Thus in 2001 in the new
CNB Bill it was stated that it would keep government accounts within its liabilities
(which it had done to date) and that it would carry out payments operations on these
accounts. The CNB would carry out payments from the accounts at the order of the FM
up to the amount of resources deposited in the account, with the proviso that it should
credit and pay out interest on resources deposited in the account. The amount of the
interest and the charges would be worked out together by the CNB and the FM accord-
ing to conditions on the market. Of course, the CNB was to charge and collect a fee for
its payments operations services. Nevertheless, the CNB, with the consent of the FM,
could authorise another institution actually to carry out payments operations for the gov-
ernment accounts. The issue to be settled here was which institution should be – the
banks or the Payments Clearing Institute?
In February 2001, the National Clearing System started working; in this, the CNB’s
authority for carrying out payments operations was transferred to the commercial banks.
However, the commercial banks (on the whole privately owned) were not willing to
carry out control of the collection of taxes and contributions that had hitherto on behalf
of the government been carried out by the Payments Clearing Institute, for which ser-
vice it had charged a fee. For this reason the question cropped up as to whether the banks
would be able to take over the role of the PCI (ZAP) and whether payments operations
would be able to unfold via the commercial banking system, necessarily involving the
payment of taxes and contributions.
In 2001, the PCI changed its name and became the Financial Agency (FINA) and con-
tinued carrying out payments operations for the government, but subcontracting to the
Croatian Postal Bank, the only state-owned bank, in which the spending agencies kept their
accounts. Thus the Croatian Postal Bank and FINA became the fiscal agents of the govern-
ment or state and went on carrying out payments operations on behalf of and at the expense
of the state1. From 2001, all government institutions (which had accounts in several com-
mercial banks) opened transaction accounts for regular business in the Croatian Postal Bank2.
Unlike the central government budget and its spending agencies, the FM allowed all local
government units to have accounts in a commercial bank of their own choice3. 
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1 Payments Operations Law, NN 117/01.
2 The Payments Operations Law of 2001 requires all legal entities to set up transaction accounts in banks
to replace the giro accounts they had in ZAP. ZAP, later FINA, in line with the special law passed in 2001, stopped
operating with giros and yet on April 1 2002 FINA went on working with the full number of employees, retaining
all the existing installations of ZAP. The responsibilities of FINA are prescribed in the Financial Agency Law
(NN 117/01).
3 An Ordinance was passed ordering banks to prepare daily summaries of the accounts of local government
for FINA. However, no similar ordinance was passed for indirect spending agencies, who were also allowed to open
their own accounts in commercial banks.2.1 Domestic payments operations via government accounts
At the beginning of 2001, the FM laid it down that spending agencies must have
only one account in a commercial bank4. The accounts of spending agencies became a
part of the system of the SAT in the CNB. In February 2002, the FM called upon nation-
al budget spending agencies to open deposit accounts for the payment of other current
expenditures in the Croatian Postal Bank (CPB), the only state owned or sponsored
bank.   The basic motivation behind this instruction was the desire of the FM to improve
the liquidity of the Treasury in such a way that it carried out payments directly to  spend-
ing agencies, not via their accounts, spread out in several banks, according to their own
choices, and to make sure of complete surveillance and control of available cash
resources.
Since 2002, the FM has not kept deposit accounts at the CNB, and all spending
agencies have closed such accounts and opened accounts in the CPB, which serves
exclusively for the payment of cash5. Since that period, all payments have been carried
out via special sub-accounts of the SAT in the CNB directly into accounts in commer-
cial banks and into the accounts of spending agencies kept in the CPB.  It should be said
that any account in the CPB is a deposit account and is a component part of the SAT.
From June 1 2002 all giro accounts of spending agencies were turned into deposit
accounts in the Croatian Postal Bank. The money from these accounts was switched into
the SAT. Since then ministries and spending agencies (regional treasuries and agencies)
have not had direct access to cash resources. Their own revenue is automatically allo-
cated by the Budget Preparation Department of the central Treasury in the FM pursuant
to reports on revenue that it obtains from the Accounting Department of the State
Treasury.
For the sake of maintaining current liquidity of the budget, the FM can recall avail-
able resources from the accounts of spending agencies6. Because of the transition to pay-
ments being made from the SAT several changes has necessarily occurred. All payments
out, including those below 200,000 kuna (or expenditure for labour, operations, pro-
curement of non-financial assets, own expenditure) are carried out from the Single
Account of the Treasury.  The treasury in the FM meets all demands for payment direct-
ly to the accounts of beneficiaries, irrespective of the amount. Since 2001, the FM has
paid from the SAT capital expenditures and wages of employees directly from the
Treasury (via the competent ministry) into private accounts in a bank of the choice of
the employee. Since 2003 the FM has paid all liabilities to suppliers (capital expendi-
tures and material costs) from the SAT. The FM transfers funds depending on the due
date for payment, and makes use of potential surpluses in the SAT at the end of the
working day for payment the next day. Surpluses that are manifested at the end of the
working day in the accounts of the spending agencies in the CPB remain government
deposits for the sake of payments to be made in the forthcoming days or months.
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4 Instruction concerning the Execution of the Budget from the Single Account of the Treasury, NN 4/01.
5 Payments Operations Law, Official Gazette 117/01 and Execution of the Budget Law, NN 116/01.
6 Execution of the National Budget for 2002 Law, NN 116/01.Payments into the SAT. Since 2002 the payments system has moved to the banks,
and the Finance Minister then prescribed which government accounts were to be opened
and kept at the CNB, determined the content of given elements of orders for the pay-
ment of taxes and other public revenue, and the periods and manner of executing these
orders. At the beginning of 2003 the FM opened 7,000 new accounts in the CNB for the
collection of revenue. Through these accounts the FM still went on operating via the
Financial Agency, subcontracting to the CPB.  FINA went on processing and distribut-
ing revenue on behalf of the Government and the FM. Public revenue could now be paid
in via the Financial Agency as well as via the commercial banks. Public revenue was on
the whole paid in via FINA to the SAT in the CNB. In 2001 and 2002 the biggest extra-
budgetary funds (for pensions, health care and employment) became part of the central
government budget, and all monetary flows were managed via the SAT in the CNB. In
this manner the FM ensured the centralisation of information about most of the finan-
cial transactions of general government. 
Since 2002 all own revenues that spending agencies make by carrying out their
basic and other activities are also paid into the SAT. However, there are also exceptions
here. The provisions do not refer to institutions of science, of tertiary, secondary and ele-
mentary education, pupil hostels, welfare institutions and diplomatic and consular mis-
sions. All other agencies most report to the competent ministry any revenue generated
or spent. The ministries supervise the generation and spending of revenue. Spending
agencies can assume liabilities and pay for them according to expenditure items for the
financing of which their own revenue is dedicated, exclusively up to the amount of own
revenue that is corrected (NN 116/02).
The system for paying in public revenue has not changed in essence as compared
with previous years (Fig. 1).
Figure 1 Flow of public revenue payments from 2001
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"#The major part of public revenue is paid via the paying-in accounts of the Financial
Agency into the SAT. Now all contributions too and most of the own revenue of the
spending agencies are also paid into the Single Account of the Treasury. Since 2003, the
FM has daily monitored the dynamics of the influx of most of the revenue into the SAT.
Payments out of the Single Account of the Treasury. For the sake of centralisation of
payments out of the SAT, the FM (the central state treasury) can effectively restrict cash
flow from the main budgetary account up to the day on which it is necessary (Fig. 2).
Figure 2 Payments from the Single Account of the Treasury since 2001
In the new system, spending agencies remit requests for payment to their ministry
(branch treasury). The ministries prepare series of payments and request the Treasury in
the FM for bulk payment. The FM transfers funds from the SAT to the relevant accounts
in the CPB or (most often) from the SAT directly to the commercial banks, pursuant to
received and authorised invoices. Giro accounts in the CPB are transaction accounts,
and the balance in them is zero, for potential surpluses are transferred to deposit
accounts, also in the CPB. The balances in the SAT (or its sub-accounts) remain as
deposits in this account at the CNB.
Although the size of transactions via the SAT is increasing, some monetary trans-
actions are still carried out from accounts that are controlled by the spending agencies
in their commercial banks. According to Article 35 of the Execution of the Budget for
2005 Law (NN 141/04), some agencies have remained outside the Treasury system:
establishments or institutes in the domain of science, tertiary education, health care, jus-
tice, welfare, culture, diplomatic and consular missions, commodity reserves, the sanc-
tions execution system, and the Ministry of Justice, although payments for material costs
and salaries are still performed from the SAT. These institutions are involved in opera-
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tions via the SAT only with respect to that part of revenue and expenditure that is
financed from the national budget. These spending agencies use their own revenue to
cover expenditure, and their deposits are kept in accounts in commercial banks. (Of
course, the balances of deposits arising from own revenues are in commercial banks and
are not in the SAT disbursements and receipts system).
2.2 Foreign currency payments system through government accounts
In 2002 the Government and the FM adopted a decision that the CNB should also
carry out foreign currency payments operations for central government and that foreign
currency resources from the commercial banks should be moved to the deposits of the
government in the SAT in the CNB. Since then foreign currency payments have been
supposed to be carried out via the single foreign currency account of the Treasury
(SFCAT) to which transactions are directed and to which the balances in foreign curren-
cies in accounts that are kept for government by the commercial banks are gradually
being transferred. With the transfer of the payments system, direct records of foreign cur-
rency payments are kept for the government by the CNB. Although the obligation exist-
ed, it was only in April 2003 that the FM opened the SFCAT in the CNB, to which the
foreign currency deposits that were held in three commercial banks (Zagrebaèka banka,
Raiffeisen banka and Privredna banka Zagreb) were gradually switched. The CNB is
obliged to provide the FM accounting evidence concerning foreign currency payments.
In parallel with the transfer of foreign currency accounts from the commercial
banks to the SAT in the CNB, in 2002 the FM set up its foreign currency accounting,
and recorded business events on the accrual basis. In 2003 the records were brought up
to date and it is possible to inspect the balances of all foreign currency accounts; state-
ments are received daily and entered into the books in the FM. Via the Treasury
System, the FM records the purchase and sale of foreign currency and the conversion
of foreign currency as well as conversion costs. Foreign currency purchases are carried
out in the Financial Flows Management Department that was set up in the Finance
Ministry. Since then commercial banks authorised to deal with other countries are
obliged to convert foreign currency budgetary revenue (taxes, duties, contributions and
other revenue) into kuna at once and to pay them into the SAT. Thanks to coordinated
activity, since 2003 it has been possible in the FM via the Treasury to determine the
balance of available monetary funds in the foreign currency accounts of the budget.
Foreign currency deposits of the national budget are kept at the CNB, and those of the
extra-budgetary funds are still however in the commercial banks.
We can say that the basic premises for being able to manage cash and liquidity have
been created by these institutional changes in the payments system and by directing the
financial operations of the government institutions via the SAT. But the FM still is faced
with the task of starting to manage the cash and liquidity of the budget.
2.3 Unsettled problems
When the payments system went over to the Treasury system in 2001, the precon-
ditions were created for the daily centralisation of budgetary resources in the SAT. In
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Management of the Public Debt Sector), a Financial Flows Department was set up.
The basic assignment of the Department is to identify cash flows and their differ-
entiation so that within the year (daily, weekly and monthly) revenue and receipts,
expenditures and outgoings can be monitored, that is, the positive and negative flows of
them. However, unfortunately, in spite of improvements of records of cash flows, up to
2005 this Department did not control the available short-term liquid resources nor did it
ensure quality financing of the budgetary deficit. However, the FM did advance in the
records of cash flows, and since 2002 has been able to work out plans of revenue and
expenditure as well as of liquidity.
Revenue plan. All changes in kuna-denominated budgetary accounts that go direct-
ly through the payments system are recorded by the Financial Agency, which informs
the Financial Flows Management Department. For the FM, the Financial Agency sep-
arately keeps records of receipts and outgoings of short-term borrowings. Since
September 2003 the FM has recorded short-term loans for the sake of liquidity and pen-
sions via the Treasury system (known as SAP). In 2003 the FM put all revenue col-
lected into the Treasury system, and a database was set up outside the system concern-
ing revenue covering data for a four-year period. They are used to forecast revenue
within the year (monthly, weekly and daily). On the basis of the revenue records of the
Financial Agency the Financial Flows Management Department distinguishes between
pure revenue money flows and receipts from short-term borrowing, long-term borrow-
ing, treasury bills and foreign currency revenue and receipts. By separating the cash
flows of its revenue, the FM is able to determine what the expectations are from so-
called pure revenue (not including receipts from borrowing), and the amount of bor-
rowing necessary, or, in the case of a positive money flow (of surpluses) the possibili-
ty of investing. 
In drawing up its expenditure plan, the FM starts out from the annual plan for the
execution of the budget, or more accurately, from the monthly financial plans.
Although the monthly plans of spending agencies are at an aggregate level, more
detailed planning is made possible by demands of spending agencies entered into the
payments system, which makes it possible to determine, for example, outflows accord-
ing to expenditure category, date of maturity or end user. The FM coordinates the
timetable and dynamics of payment with the dynamics of inflows of revenue during the
month, and includes all payments due into detailed expenditure plans according to date
of maturity.
Since September 2004, in parallel with the production of plans of revenue and
expenditure, the FM has also drawn up liquidity plans, or monthly and weekly forecasts
of liquidity according to liabilities assumed by spending agencies and expected inflows
of money. Since 2003 the FM’s Treasury System has enabled advance warning of the
generation of liabilities, the basic criterion for meeting a liability being the date payment
is due. Thus the FM draws up liquidity plans based on a complete picture of liabilities
that have fallen due. But the FM, in its elaboration of liquidity plans, still has to take into
consideration the category of large expenditures (for capital expenditures for example),
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any essential monthly changes. Thus the FM, in an operational sense, up to 2005, in
spite of technical improvements in the recording of money flows, did not manage cash
and liquidity. 
3 Opportunities for and constraints on the participation of the Finance 
Ministry in the money market
This chapter draws points up the necessity for a better-quality management of cash
and liquidity in the FM and deals with the crucial problem of who is managing the cash
and liquidity of the national budget.
3.1 Payments operations from and into governmental accounts 
The Financial Agency (the former Institute for Payments Clearing) even after 2001
went on carrying out domestic currency payments operations on the behalf and account
of the government, and still, pursuant to annual contracts with the FM, charges a fee
for the operations it carries out. The contract and the amount of the fee laid down in the
contract are not information that is accessible to the public. Unfortunately, the
Government and the FM still have not settled the status of the Financial Agency in the
system of government finances and have defined the agency as a government institu-
tion (a spending agency) that supplies information support to the Treasury system, car-
ries out payments operations for the government, records revenue and expenditure, and
keeps a register of spending agencies. FINA performs all these matters for the govern-
ment with commercial conditions that are unknown.
In 2001 the main change in government finances was the payment of contributions
for pensions and health insurance and most of the own revenues that spending agencies
were able to dispose of independently into the SAT. Since 2003 the FM has been able
to keep a daily check on the influx of most of the revenue into the Single Account of
the Treasury.
In parallel with the centralisation of payments into the Treasury, the FM has also
centralised most of the disbursements from the SAT. Thanks to improvements and the
increased scope of financial transactions via the Single Account of the Treasury, the
Finance Ministry has an insight into and can directly control most of the financial
transactions of the budget of general government. Thus the first premise for the man-
agement of cash and liquidity has been provided for in the FM7 – financial operations
of spending agencies within the system of the domestic and foreign currency SATs in
the CNB.
3.2 Consolidation of the budget
Thanks to the consolidation of the budget, in which the largest extra-budgetary
funds (retirement and healthcare) were incorporated into the central government budget,
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7 General government consists of the central government, the extra-budgetary funds and local government units.since 2002 the FM has been able to keep a central check on revenue and expenditure of
the national budget and to manage them (Graph 1).
Graph 1 Expenditure of the central government budget as % of total expenditure 
of the general government budget between 1994 and 2004
Source: Finance Ministry (2005)
Up to 2001 the FM directly controlled about 40% of the expenditure of general gov-
ernment, but from 2002 the Government and the FM have increased the scope of finan-
cial transactions within the budget to about 80% of the expenditures of general govern-
ment. Thus the FM has achieved the second premise for the management of cash flow
and liquidity – the centralization of the financial operations of most of the institutions of
government within the central government budget.
3.3 Outstanding liabilities
Only since 2000 has the FM supervised and controlled outstanding liabilities of
budgetary spending agencies (Table 2). Not, it is true, completely, for institutions from
the healthcare system do not meet their liabilities in the anticipated periods and the FM
is obliged to provide collateral by the issue of short-term bonds, which thus increases
the public debt.
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 Table 2 Outstanding liabilities of the central government budget, 
situation as of the end of the period (in million kuna)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a
1. Brought forward from previous year — 1.236 147 123 101 --- 18
2. New liabilities in the current year: — 2.043 359 442 313 1.290 698
a) HZZO [Medical Fund] liabilities 316 500 1.062 455
b) HZMO [Pension Fund] liabilities 126 42 1 12
c) other spending agencies’ liabilities 227 231
3. Total outstanding liabilities (1+2) 9.586 3.279 506 565 956 1.290 716
a NB: data for 2005, as of July 31
Source: IMF and Finance Ministry (2005) 
It can be seen that of the 9.5 billion of outstanding liabilities at the end of 1999,
506 million kuna remained in 2001. However, when the EBFs, for healthcare and pen-
sions, were included in the budgetary system, outstanding liabilities of the central
government budget increased to 956 million kuna in 2003 and 1.3 billion kuna in
2004. Thanks to the new government borrowing, in 2005 outstanding liabilities
decreased on 716 mil kn. It should be pointed out that since 2001 the FM, at first quar-
terly and then monthly, has controlled the outstanding liabilities of all spending agen-
cies and has thus attained the third precondition for cash flow and liquidity manage-
ment – supervision and control of liabilities. Of course, the issue of the orderly set-
tlement of outstanding liabilities of spending agencies, mainly the institutions from
the healthcare system, still remains.
3.4 Playing with government deposits
Is the FM capable of managing the short-term liquid funds of the budget? We could
look at the balance of deposits of consolidated central government (the central govern-
ment budget and the EBFs) in the CNB and the amount of short-term loans of the CNB
to government (Graph 2).
Deposits of the central government budget in the CNB have increased from 930 mil-
lion kuna in 1995 to 1.2 billion kuna in 2005. The state has occasionally borrowed from
the CNB, mainly in 1999. Interestingly enough, in spite of the existence of available
short-term liquid funds and deposits, because it was unable to manage cash and liquid-
ity, up to 2001 the FM on the whole took loans for the purposes of liquidity from the
CNB, and from government institutions as well. The prohibition of borrowing at the
CNB from 20018 gave the FM the opportunity independently to manage deposits and
liquidity and to participate in the money market with budgetary surpluses or to borrow
by direct loans from commercial banks.
Thanks to the operations in and consolidation of funds in the SAT, from 2001 the
available deposits of the government budget in the CNB have increased. Since April
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8 CNB Law, NN 36/01.2003 the balance of deposits has increased thanks to the switching of foreign currency
payments and deposits to the SAT at the CNB. However, still, most of the financial
assets of central government (mainly deposits) are in commercial banks. This is shown
by the figures in the following graph.
Graph 2 Deposits and short-term loans of the central government budget 
in the CNB, 1994-2005 (in billion kuna)
NB: CGD – Central government deposits in the CNB
Source: HNB (2005) 
Total deposits of central government increased from 2.9 billion kuna in 1995 to
8.3 billion kuna in 2005. Thus the FM, in collaboration with the CNB, centralised as
well as increased the amount of deposits of the central government budget in the SAT
from 396 million kuna in 1995 to 1.5 billion kuna in 2005. However, the largest part
of central government deposits are located in the commercial banks, increasing from
1.8 billion in 1995 to as much as 6.8 billion kuna in 2005. This refers primarily to
EBF deposits, which when the two largest EBFs were moved into the budget did not
reduce but were actually increased. Still, for a more detailed insight into the inabili-
ty of the FM to control deposits of the government in the commercial banks and to
manage them, Table 3 gives figures of amount and structure of general government
deposits.
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CGD CNB CNB creditGraph 3 Central government deposits (of the central government budget and the EBFs)
in the CNB and in commercial banks from 1993 to 2005 (in billion kuna)
CGD CNB – deposits of central government in the CNB CGDB – deposits of central government
in the commercial banks, Total CGD – total deposits of central government
Source: HNB (2005) 
Table 3 Amount and structure of general government deposits from 2000 to 2005 
(in million kuna)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a
1. Central budget deposits 5.033 4.136 3.143 2.007 1.564 2.505
short term 2.380 1.970 1.312 992 795 1.823
time deposits 2.654 2.166 1.831 1.015 769 682
2. EBF 2.706 3.251 3.560 3.716 5.592 5.231
short term 185 436 706 413 531 526
time deposits 2.521 2.815 2.854 3.303 5.060 4.704
3. Local units 967 1.381 2.430 2.591 2.592 2.587
short term 728 1.039 1.937 2.035 2.041 1.963
time deposits 239 342 492 555 551 625
4. General government (1+2+3) 8.706 8.768 9.133 8.313 9.748 10.322
short term  3.293 3.444 3.956 3.440 3.367 4.312
time deposits 5.413 5.324 5.177 4.873 6.380 6.011
Deposits in financial institutions (a + b) 8.706 8.768 9.133 8.313 9.748 10.322
a) CNB 1.009 1.752 608 440 334 1.456
b) Banks 7.697 7.016 8.525 7.874 9.414 8.867
aNB: data for 2005, as of January 31
Source: HNB (2005)
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4General government deposits thus increased from 8.7 billion in 2000 to 10.3 billion
kuna in 2005. Most of these government deposits, which increased from 2.7 billion in
2000 to as much as 5.2 billion in 2005, are placed in commercial banks, mainly the time
deposits of the EBFs.
The deposits of local government units increased from 967 million in 2000 to about
2.6 billion kuna in 2005. These deposits are also mainly kept in commercial banks, i.e.,
outside the system of the SAT and the government financial information system. Since
the FM cannot impact the deposits of local government units, it cannot objectively make
decisions about the amount of grants (aid) to give to local government units from the cen-
tral government budget. For according to currency practice, local government units sup-
ply financial reports to the FM quarterly, half-yearly and annually. With a direct view into
and control of the balances in the accounts of local government units in the CNB the FM
would be able to use at least a part of those 2 billion kuna in the accounts of local units
kept in commercial banks for the financing of short-term budgetary deficits (Bajo, 2004).
This would obviate the absurdity of the FM financing the short-term budgetary deficits
with loans from the commercial banks, at the same time allocating local units grants,
although they already have at their disposal surpluses in accounts in commercial banks9.
In other words, although there is a financial potential available, which the FM, in collab-
oration with the CNB, might use primarily through laying out surpluses in the money
market, but also to cover short-term deficits of spending agencies in and outside the bud-
get, this potential is not being employed. Instead of that, the budget and the taxpayer are
unnecessarily burdened with the costs of servicing short-term loans.
3.4.1 The Croatian Postal Bank – from fiscal agent of the government 
to a genuine commercial bank
Since 2001 the CPB has become a fiscal agent of the government, via which out-
going payments are made from the transaction accounts of government institutions to
end users. Deposits are also to be found in the government accounts in the CPB.
Although we do not have up-to-date information about the balance of government
deposits in the CPB, the figures from the following graph are indicative enough.
Government deposits in the CPB increased from 26 million in 2001 to about 1.3 bil-
lion in 2002. The CPB planned for government deposits in 2003 of approximately 1.2
billion kuna. It should be pointed out that deposits in the CPB are an integral part of the
government deposits in the SAT at the CNB, but only on paper, and not in reality.
Because cash flow and liquidity are not managed, the FM uses CPB deposits as a loan
potential for the short-term financing of the government, at market conditions and mar-
ket rates of interest.
Thus another absurd situation in the public finances of Croatia has been created. In
a normal market system the government should privatise the CPB and invite tenders so
as to be able to choose the banks in which the state institutions would open transaction
accounts as part of the SAT system, and transparently, in agreement with the banks, lay
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9 The criteria according to which the Government and the FM allocate grants to lgu s are not the subject of
this article (On the Criteria for the Allocation of Grants, see: Bajo, 1999).down the conditions and amount of the rates of interest for the kuna deposits (sight and
time) in these banks. Instead of this, the privileged position of the Croatian Postal Bank,
which uses state deposits for the short-time financing of the same state, but at market
terms and conditions, has become institutionalised. This is clearly a classic form of rent,
which lobby groups around the CPB have managed to win. Judging from debates in the
media, it will not be easy to put an end to this absurd situation by the privatisation of the
CPB, and it will perhaps be even deepened by the transformation of this bank into a
“strong” state bank that, allegedly, would be supposed to finance development.
3.5 Short term borrowing of the central government budget
For a more complete insight into the situation of the liquidity of the central budget,
it is necessary to determine the average balance of liquid resources, and of short-term
loans for the sake of liquidity that the FM takes directly from the commercial banks and
to a smaller degree on the money market (Graph 5)
The FM (central budget) in 2002 had at the monthly level about 324 million kuna
daily at its disposal, which it could have used as a surplus of liquid funds and could have
employed them to advantage on the money market. However, in spite of the liquid
funds, the FM directly borrowed from the commercial banks, by an average of 89 mil-
lion kuna. In 2003 the FM had 196 million kuna at its disposal and yet at the same time
took on loans at commercial banks of 103 million kuna. In 2004 the average daily bal-
ance on the government account was 214 million kuna, and yet the FM took on loans to
the tune of 173 million kuna. This means that the short term loans that the state takes on
from the banks are smaller than the available monetary resources of the government. In
such conditions it can be expected that the FM, apart from borrowing on the Zagreb
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Graph 4 Structure of deposits in the CPB from 2001 to 2003 (in billion kuna)
Source: Croatian Postal Bank (2003)
Households Private sector Public sector Other deposits
0 0.5 1 1.5 2   2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
2001 . 
2002
plan 2003  
estimatedmoney market, will borrow greater amounts at the commercial banks as well, mainly
from the largest. Graph 6 shows the amounts of interest on short-term loans of the bud-
get on the money market and directly (for larger amounts) at the commercial banks.
Graph 6 Parallel interest rates on direct bank loans and interest rates 
on the Zagreb Money Market (in %)
NB: ZMM – interest rates at the Zagreb Money Market; 4MB+HPB – interest rates at the four
major banks and the Croatian Postal Bank
Source: Finance Ministry (2005) 
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Graph 5 Short term government borrowing versus the balance of the central 
government budget (daily average at the monthly level) 
from January 1 2002 to November 1 2004 (in million kuna)
NB: STL – the average amount of short-term loans of commercial banks; BCGB – balance of the
central government budget.
Source: Finance Ministry (2005)
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5It can be seen that the interest rates on the short-term loans that the FM takes
directly from the four major banks and the state-owned CPB are larger than those on
the Zagreb Money Market. The difference in these interests in 2003 came to about
1%, in favour of direct loans from the commercial banks, with the proviso that in
2004 the government on the whole took out short-term loans only from commercial
banks at an average interest rate of 7%. However, this perhaps would not be a prob-
lem if the interest rates on the short term loans of government and of other institu-
tional sectors, primarily the households and private sectors, were not practically
identical (Graph 7).
Graph 7 Rates of interest on short-term loans per institutional sector – foreign 
currency clause (in %)
NB: Interest rates on short-term loans of commercial banks to the government do not contain
the foreign currency clause
Source: HNB and Finance Ministry, (2005) 
Up to June 2003 there were some differences, but from that date the interest rates in
conjunction with the foreign currency clause on short-term loans and the interest rates
on government short-term loans with no currency clause are almost identical. And yet
naturally, our initial if perhaps na?ve assumption is that a short term loan to the gov-
ernment is attended with the lowest risk. In 2004 and 2005 interest rates came on aver-
age to about 7%. This shows that the financial market perceives the financial good
standing of the public sector as being not a whit better than the financial good standing
of the retail and corporate sectors, and classifies them practically identically, assigning
an equal degree of risk. The fact that the state cannot manage to secure lower rates of
interest for itself is another confirmation that the financing of the short-term debt is a
problem indeed for the government.
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Central government  Private sector Household3.5.1 The nature of the short-term public debt
Particularly since 2001, the government has taken on short-term debt in two ways:
by the issue of treasury bills and by direct loans from commercial banks10. It is a fact
that the largest part of the short-term debt has been created by the issue of treasury bills.
Thus we should look at graph 8 the amount of interest on treasury bills according to
maturity. 
Graph 8 Interest rates on Finance Ministry treasury bills from 1996 to 2005 (in %)
Source: Finance Ministry (2005)
The FM is extending the periods for the redemption of treasury bills. From 1996,
when it first issued treasury bills, the FM borrowed at 42, 91 and 182 day periods and
in 2002 went over to a period of 364 days. In parallel with this, the average rate of inter-
est on treasury bills was reduced from a high 11% in 1996 to about 5% in 2005. The
reduction of interest rates led to more favourable terms of short-term borrowing, as well
as a large increase in the short-term debt created by the issue of treasury bills. The over-
all short-term debt of the government has markedly increased since 1993, as shown by
the figures in Graph 9.
Total government short-term debt increased from 517 million kuna in 1993 to 16
billion kuna in 2005, and this can realistically be called long-term. The government cre-
ates the major part of its short-term debt by the issue of treasury bills, which increased
from 272 million in 1996 to as much as 13 billion kuna in 2005. However, the growth
in the overall short-term debt is partially the consequence of the increased amounts of
loans for liquidity (mainly for pensions) that the FM takes on from the commercial
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10 A third category could be due and still outstanding liabilities of spending agencies.
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42 day 91 day 182 day 364 daybanks. Liquidity loans increased from 620 million kuna in 2000 to 3.9 billion kuna in
2005. The explosion in short-term borrowing because the FM does not manage its liq-
uidity and cash flow brought the FM to the point at which it ultimately had to turn dou-
ble short-term debts into one long-term debt, because of which it sells bonds on the
domestic and foreign market. Thus in April 2005, in order to settle its short-term debts
to the banks, the government issued bonds in the amount of 3.5 billion kuna, which is
about 90% of the direct short-term debt (loans) of the state to domestic commercial
banks. The Government and the FM adduced as reasons for these new borrowings
“financing of the orderly execution of the budget”, which is in essence just borrowing
to finance current budgetary expenditures, mostly the pensions. In such conditions the
question not only arises as to who in the FM is managing cash flow and liquidity but
also as to who is managing the public debt. This issue, however, is not the topic of the
current paper.
4 Conclusion 
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the FM only partially manages
cash flows through the government accounts and the daily, weekly and monthly mone-
tary potential of the government. A large part of the deposits of the government, partic-
ularly of the extra-budgetary funds and local government units, are to be found in com-
mercial banks, the result being that the FM and the CNB cannot have any impact on this
part of the liquid resources of the central government budget. In such conditions the FM
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Graph 9 Short-term central budget debt from 1993 to 2005 (in billion kuna) 
Source: HNB (2005)
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worth of bonds issuedstill is taking on debt directly at the commercial banks, even at its own (state-owned)
Croatian Postal Bank, at market conditions and rates, instead of using the surpluses of
budgetary resources to cover short-term deficits of budgetary and extra-budgetary
spending agents and figuring on the money market.
Since 2001, when short term borrowing at the CNB was stopped, it should have
become clear to the Government and the FM that the functions of executing the budget
and the management of cash and liquidity are the basic functions of the budgetary sys-
tem, and that they could have an effect on slowing down the growth of the public debt
and public spending. However, awareness of the nature and value of public money is in
Croatia as yet developed neither among the powerful nor in the public, so that there is
no discussion at all of the absurd situations delineated in this paper.
For the FM to be able to control cash flow and liquidity of the central budget, it is
necessary for:
• the FM and the CNB to collaborate in the management of the monetary potential
of the budget
• the FM to set up and improve its cash flow and liquidity management and, as well
as recording, actually to start managing the available financial potential. This
means above all investing budgetary surpluses on the money market, the financ-
ing of the short-term deficits of spending agencies and extra-budgetary funds
(internal operations of the Treasury) with available liquid funds and, in agreement
with the banks, the selection of the most favourable financial services provider, by
for example the opening of transaction accounts
• the Government to privatise the CPB
• the Government and the FM to centralise foreign currency deposits in the SAT in
the CNB, and for the FM to consolidate EBF deposits and start managing them
• local government units to start operating via their own SATs, which they should
open at the CNB.
Potential constraints on the achievement of these proposals are the questionable
existing technical capacity of the FM to manage cash and liquidity and to collaborate
with the CNB; resistance of spending agencies and extra-budgetary funds to operating
via the SAT and to the centralised management of deposits of the state in the FM, the
resistance of local government units to operating via single treasury accounts opened in
the CNB and the lack of political will to privatise the CPB.
We should mention that the key reasons for the resistance of budgetary spending
agencies and extra-budgetary spending agencies are related to their loss of autonomy in
the use of their own revenues for the financing of expenditure not recorded in the bud-
get. Apart from this, resistance of local government units might be related to activities
of the Finance Ministry that, if it had an immediate insight into the balances of accounts
of the local government units in the CNB, would surely prevent the accumulation of
deposits in these accounts, and would encourage the better employment of grants allo-
cated for the financing of specified (decentralised) obligations.
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• If the government participates on the Zagreb Money Market and if there is coor-
dinated action of the FM and the CNB, direct short-term borrowing at banks might
be done away with, and more transparent short-term financing of the central bud-
get with treasury bills alone could be ensured, more cheaply, at that.
• Privatisation of the banks does not mean a loss of sovereignty in the management
of fiscal and monetary policy.
• With good cash flow and liquidity management the FM can help the CNB to run
monetary policy, particularly in making sure of effective control of the credit
potential of commercial banks and in management of the exchange rate. The par-
ticipation of the FM with surplus funds on the Zagreb Money Market would not
(with good management) undermine monetary stability.
• Opening SATs of local government units in the CNB would give the FM the
capacity to define better criteria for the allocation of grants from the budget. 
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The Institutional Organisation of Payments Operations and the Account 
of the Treasury from 1994 to 2001
In 1994 the FM opened the Single Account of the Treasury at the Croatian National
Bank. This account was supposed to be a system of accounts serving for the reception,
keeping, payment and transfer of all revenue, receipts and expenditures and other pay-
ments of the budget. Public money collected and charged that belongs to the budget was
supposed to be paid into the SAT in the CNB. Not a single expenditure or any other pay-
ment was not be performed from the SAT without the prior authorisation of the central
State Treasury of the FM. The Finance Minister himself was supposed to prescribe the
manner of and procedure for operating via the SAT. Only the minister had the right to
dispose of money in the SAT, with the proviso that he could transfer this authority to one
or more responsible persons (comptrollers) of the State Treasury11. From January 1 1977
the FM was supposed to carry out payment operations via the SAT. However, operations
with the accounts of the state were crucially determined by the position and role of the
Institute for Payments Clearing, or ZAP, a state institution via which the FM carried out
payments operations connected with the accounts of the state and the many accounts that
the spending agents had in commercial banks, according to their own choice. Hence for
the performance of all payments into and out of the SAT to become a reality the FM and
the Government had to reform payments operations and to make sure that they were per-
formed by the commercial banks, to define the role of the Institute for Payments Clearing
within the system of government finances and to select the banks in which spending
agencies should have their transaction accounts and to provide for the operations of all
institutions via the system of the foreign currency and domestic currency SAT.
Kuna or domestic currency payments operations
From 1994 to 2001, Institute for Payments Clearing on behalf of and at the account of
the government kept the accounts for the execution of the budget of all the institutes of the
government, of local government units and of the extra-budgetary funds and daily informed
the FM of taxes collected and every ten days of revenue collected. The Institute transferred,
for the FM, resources to the accounts of spending agencies, carried out the distribution of
shared taxes among the different levels of government, and collected all local taxes and
each month informed the local government units about the revenue collected. For the oper-
ations it performed, the Institute entered into annual contracts with the FM and charged fees
for these services. As early as 1994 the Government and the FM had planned that payments
operations should be carried out by the banks and that the role of the Institute should be
determined, as well as the purview of the Institute in the operations that it carried out on the
behalf and account of the state. For this reason it was necessary to introduce new procedures
into the CNB and into the commercial banks in which the spending agencies had their
accounts for the elaboration of the precise dynamics and steps for the closing of the exist-
ing accounts of ministries and spending agencies kept in these banks and to ensure the move
to payments into and from the SAT in the CNB. Hence the establishment of the State
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11 Ordinance on the Composition of the Main Book of the Treasury and the Manner of Running the SAT, NN 97/95.Treasury and payment from the SAT are linked with the “reform of payments operations
and hence with the transfer to (giro) accounts of the central government budget to the
CNB and also with payments operations connected with these accounts” (Cota, 1998:80).
However, the Government and the Finance Ministry decided in 1994 that the
Institute for Payments Clearing, because of its good information infrastructure, should
carrying on working as a fiscal agent of the state and should carry out for the state
domestic currency payments via the SAT in the CNB. Thus from 1994 to 2001 the pay-
ments system was dominated by the Institute with services that the FM and the
Government, pursuant to contractual government outsourcing, used to control all cash
flows into and out of the government’s accounts.
Unlike other services, which state institutions and firms obtained on the basis of
public competition, up to 2001 the choice of bank in which accounts would be opened
was left up to the spending agencies. Unfortunately, in the FM there was no knowledge
about the criteria for the choice of banks in which the spending agencies opened their
accounts, nor was there any information about the number of accounts and the equiva-
lence of conditions in the banks. In such conditions the FM was supposed, in parallel
with making sure that the state treasury function, to select the most favourable finan-
cial services providers for services such as the opening of giro accounts for the gov-
ernment and to ensure the transfer of kuna and foreign currency accounts and deposits
from the commercial banks to SAT system at the CNB. Nevertheless, Table 4 shows
the number of accounts held by spending agencies in 2001.
Table 4 Number of accounts of public sector institutions in 2001
2001
Accounts in the CNB
domestic currency 1
foreign currency 1
Accounts of budgets, bodies of government administration and local government units
Central government budget and local government units 2
accounts of spending agents for payments out of the SAT 68
accounts of bodies of the government administration
and of local government units 499
Accounts of institutes and funds
Croatian Institute for Retirement Insurance 1
Solidarity Fund 1
Accounts for the collection of public revenue in the CNB
accounts of revenue of the central government budget and of local government units 7.700
accounts of revenues of public enterprises, associations and so on 932
accounts of revenues of institutes 158
evidentiary accounts of revenues of bodies 
of the central government administration and of local government units 111
Accounts of central government budget spending agencies 
and of local government units in the banks
in commercial banks 1.698
in CNB 456
Total 11.631
Source: Finance Ministry (2001)
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eign currency accounts of the Treasury in the CNB, most of the accounts in the CNB
were not incorporated into the SAT system. In addition, ministries and government
agencies had another 60 accounts in the CNBN, and the end spending agencies had
474. To these accounts we need to add the accounts of local government units (544
municipalities and cities and 21 counties) and the spending agencies of their budgets.
Although the spending agencies did have accounts in the CNB, they were not incorpo-
rated into the Treasury system that comprised the SAT as a system of sub-accounts of
budgetary spending agencies. Hence the FM could not possibly centralise the manage-
ment of monetary resources via the SAT. However, an additional constraint consisted
of the 1,698 accounts of the spending agencies in the many commercial banks12.
Although these accounts were opened in commercial banks, payments operations to do
with the accounts of the government still went on via the Payments Clearing Institute,
and not via the commercial banks.
Up to 2001 the problem of managing cash and liquidity inhered in this fragmenta-
tion of the monetary resources of the central government budget and the extra-bud-
getary funds into numerous accounts in various banks, instead of their being centralised
in a single foreign currency and a single domestic currency account of the central gov-
ernment budget by way of a system of sub-accounts in the CNB. All this created a con-
fusion concerning the real state of affairs to do with the cash of the government in com-
mercial banks because there was no transparent selection of the banks in which the
spending agencies would open their transaction accounts.
In 1995 the FM and the Government stipulated that the payments of all revenue
and receipts that belonged to the budget must go to the SAT in the CNB13. The main
agent for the payment of public revenue was the Institute for Payments Clearing that,
thanks to its ramified network of local offices, was able to perform payments opera-
tions connected with the accounts used for paying in government revenue. The
Institute kept accounts for spending agencies of the budget, the extra-budgetary funds
and local government units, while the FM used the data of the Institute in order to
determine the dynamics of payments into and out of the government’s accounts.
Revenue from the Institute’s account (on behalf of the FM), in statutorily defined per-
centages, were allocated to budgetary and extra-budgetary spending agencies and to
local government units. The key for the distribution was decided by the FM. The prob-
lem here was that the kuna accounts for the collection of revenue of the central gov-
ernment budget were in CNB deposits, while the accounts of the extra-budgetary
funds were in the commercial banks. Figure 3 shows the inflow of payments of pub-
lic revenue.
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12 There were most accounts in the Zagrebaèka (449), Privredna (201), Splitska (175), Rijeèka (154) and Slavonska
(131) banks.  The other agencies' accounts were parcelled out among the other commercial banks, in a range of from
65 in one to one account in a bank.
13 Ordinance on the Composition of the Main Book of the Treasury and the Manner of Running the SAT,
NN 97/95. Figure 3 Public revenue payment flows
In spite of the considerable portion of revenues from tax and non-tax revenues
paid into the accounts in the CNB, the contributions of the extra-budgetary funds (for
health care, retirement insurance and employment) remained outside the system of
payments into the SAT, and were paid into accounts in commercial banks. An addi-
tional constraint on the determination of the real size of revenue necessary for the esti-
mate of the resources available for the financing of the monthly expenditures of
spending agencies were the “own revenues” of spending agencies. The spending agen-
cies, that is, died not pay heir own revenues into the budget or the SAT, rather, these
revenues remained in their own accounts. Only from 1998 did the FM state that the
spending agencies of the budget had to use their own revenues for the improvement
of their activity and that they should be shared in accordance with a set percentage for
the coverage of given operating expenditures. Still, own revenues (in spite of the
annual obligation to report to the FM) continued to remain outside the budgetary sys-
tem and were not incorporated into the system of payments into and out of the SAT
in the CNB. Thus in spite of the needs for the financing of the short-term deficit of the
budget, some of the resources that should have been in the national budget were actu-
ally on deposit in the commercial banks.
Up to 2001, payments from the budget were performed in two ways: via the trans-
action accounts of the ministries in commercial banks from which end payments to the
giro accounts of budgetary beneficiaries were made in some other commercial bank, and
through the SAT or the sub-account of the ministries and spending agencies in the CNB
to accounts in commercial banks. The FM transferred money above all from the SAT to
the competent ministries (agencies). The ministries (agencies) further directed money to
the individual bank accounts of spending agencies who then met their liabilities with this
money (Vašiæek, 1998:46). This kind of practice could have been avoided if the func-
tion of executing budgetary expenditures from the SAT had been established
(Linzbauer, 2000:253).
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In parallel with this, from 1996, the FM started out making payments for capital
expenditures greater than 200,000 kuna from the SAT. These payments were made for
spending agencies that had certain capital expenditures provided for in the national bud-
get14. In June 1997, 11 spending agencies were included into the system for the payment
of wages, material costs and liabilities to suppliers via the SAT15. Up to 2001 another 17
ministries and agencies or 28 competent institutions of a total of 41 were additionally
incorporated into the system. Figure 4 shows how the payments process was organised.
Figure 4 the payment of public expenditures
The Payments Institute collected payment orders of spending agencies, according to
which payment orders were sent to the end beneficiaries. The Payments Institute aggre-
gated all the applications for the ministries, and the ministries sent an application for
payment to the FM. The FM then transferred resources to the accounts of the competent
ministries in the commercial banks. After that the ministries transferred funds to the
accounts of their own spending agencies, opened in several banks at their own choice.
The Payments Institute carried out a detailed breakdown of payments and informed the
FM of the job that had been done.
The FM executed some of the payments directly from the SAT, into the accounts of
suppliers, and for capital expenditures as well as, partially, for operational expenditure
(wages and material costs). However, the FM carried out most of the payments to the
202
A. Bajo: Managing the Cash and Liquidity of the Croatian Budget
Financial Theory and Practice 29 (2), 175-204 (2005)
14 Instruction on the payment of capital expenditures from the SAT, NN 13/96 and 60/97.
15 Office of the President, Parliament, Government, Constitutional Court, Social Protection Fund, Central Statistics
Office, and the ministries of: internal affairs, foreign affairs, finance, maritime affairs, transport and communications
and tourism, and the ministry of health , Decision on the Transition of Some of the Agencies of the Government
Budget to Direct Payments from the SAT in 1997, NN 56/97.
		
"$
			



	










"#
	

 

%

		&
'
	(	
)
	(	
 
%
	

 
	

 203
A. Bajo: Managing the Cash and Liquidity of the Croatian Budget
Financial Theory and Practice 29 (2), 175-204 (2005)
accounts of spending agencies in commercial banks that were not within the State
Treasury system.
There are however many accounts of spending agencies in banking accounts that
are not involved in the State Treasury system. This particularly refers to the accounts of
the extra-budgetary funds in commercial banks. These are transaction accounts and pay-
ments from the accounts of the extra-budgetary funds are made to the accounts of their
beneficiaries and suppliers in the commercial banks. Thanks to the disunited and decen-
tralised system of payment, the FM was unable to establish the dynamics with which
funds entered and exited the accounts of the extra-budgetary funds inside a month.
Unfortunately, the FM made use of the infrastructure of the Payments Clearing Institute
for payments operations, but not also for the management of cash and deposits in
accounts in commercial banks.
Foreign currency payments operations
Foreign currency payments operations had a similar fate. Up to 2003 the FM did not
carry out foreign currency payments from or into the SAT in the CNB. Government for-
eign currency payments operations were carried out by the commercial banks. The FM
enabled spending agencies to have foreign currency accounts in the commercial banks
to cover their needs for foreign currency funds. From 1994 to 2001 in the execution of
the budget laws the FM required all spending agencies to pay any foreign currency funds
acquired to a special state account in Privredna banka Zagreb. However, foreign cur-
rency receipts and revenues were not centralised in the Single Foreign Currency
Account of the Treasury in the CNB. This single foreign currency account would have
enabled the FN constant insight into and control of the flows of foreign currency and the
balances of foreign currency deposits. Although the FM did open the Single Foreign
Currency Account of the Treasury at the CNB, it was not used for the performance of
foreign currency payments. The FM largely made use of the commercial banks for the
performance of the foreign currency operations of foreign debt servicing. 